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Al~Iract--This paper considers ordinary least-squares (OLS) models of competitive markets wherein the 
independent variable represents rader information which should be a predictor of the market clearing 
price. The market context of the OLS model draws a parallel with an additive noise channel having 
noiseless feedback. The feedback link represents he information gained by the trader from observing 
present prices and using this information to modify his next round of market activity. Several models from 
the economic literature are shown to fit this prescribed information channel format and information theory 
constructs are used to interpret their economic results. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider linear, memoryless, additive noise models as representations of information channels 
in the Shannon [1] sense. The supposition is made that the model population coefficients atisfy 
the conditions of an ordinary, least-squares (OLS), regression. This supposition places a variance 
constraint on the transmitted signals and leads to new results when a noiseless feedback path exists 
around the channel. The example of OLS models of competitive markets is especially amenable 
to information channel analysis because the OLS model and its attendant assumptions are, in an 
economic ontext, an integral part of the model. 
Several levels of models are considered. Single and multivariable OLS models provide 
the theoretical structure of the economic results. The Grossman-Stiglitz [2], continuous 
state, additive Gaussian oise market model is shown to be the link between the concept of a 
competitive economic equilibrium and single and multiple access channels of information theory. 
The rational expectations hypothesis model of Muth [3] is then shown to be a discrete state 
information channel for which codes based on noiseless price feedback achieve channel capacity. 
The final economic model analyzed combines the multivariable OLS structure with multiple access 
channel theory as an explanation of the dependence of long-term interest rates on related economic 
variables. 
2. THE OLS CHANNEL WITH FEEDBACK 
The information source, whose samples are to be transmitted by the OLS channel, produces a
random variable ~r every period T = 0, 1, 2 . . . . .  and Xr ~ N(0, g~). In any period the channel has 
the characterization 
y ,=f lxk+n, ,  k= l ,2  . . . . .  N (1) 
and n, ~ N(0, a 2) independent ofx,. The coding problem is to select he x, based on ~r and past 
estimates thereof so as to optimally encode £r according to prescribed criteria. A constraint on (1) 
is that channel users do not know/~ but will use an OLS estimate of this parameter. From OLS 
theory the population parameters constraining the channel are 
p = E(xy) l ,7 : , ,  ~ = p~, la , ,  a~ = a~(1 - p~). (2) 
From (2) the signal flXk must satisfy for every k the constraint 
Var(flx,) 2 2 2 =/~ o'x = p o'.(1 - p2).  (3) 
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The well-known Shannon result for a Gaussian oise channel with signal variance constrained by 
E > 0 gives the capacity expression (in natural ogarithms) 
C = N/2 log(1 + E/a~) nats per source sample 
= 1/2 log0 + E/o~) nats per channel use. (4) 
Applying (2) and (3) to (4) yields for the OLS channel 
C = -1 /2  log(1 -p2)  nats per channel use. (5) 
This result was apparently first found by Kullback [4] in a non OLS context. 
Feedback is employed by the channel user in such a way that with knowledge of the present 
source sample :~0, his past estimate :~k-, of ~0, and Yk he can optimally select xk so that :~k --* :~0 
as k --, N in the mean-square sense. This procedure will produce optimal OLS encoding. 
3. OPT IMAL  OLS  CODES 
It is well-known [5] that the minimum distortion, Dm~n, any coding scheme can achieve for the 
linear additive noise channel satisfies 
R (Drain) = C (6) 
where R(.) is the rate distortion function of the source. When :~ is Gaussian, 
R(D) = max [0, ½ log(a~/D)]. (7) 
From (4) and (7), 
Dmi n = 0"~(1 -- p2)~'. (S) 
An OLS channel code is optimal if Dmiu in (8) is achieved by the code. Dmi, is of practical concern 
in economic markets ince 
Dmin = min[var(:~0 - :~k)] (9) 
where the minimum is over choices of :~k" We note that if the distortion is small enough it can 
be said that all of the market traders have "caught on" to the latest information driving the 
market. 
The optimal estimates :~k are found by a trivial extension of the Schalkwijk-Bluestein [6]results. 
Define 
"ek = ~Xk (I 0a) 
and the sequences Qk and Bk by the recursive formulae 
~k=Qk(~0--~k_l), :~0=0, k=1,2  . . . . .  N; 
~k = ~k- ~ + Bk (?k + nk), k = 1, 2 . . . . .  N. (10b) 
The sequence Qk is selected so that constraint (3) is met for all k and Bk is selected so that :~k is 
a minimum mean-square-error estimate of ~0 given ~,m+n,,,m = 1, 2 . . . .  k. These conditions 
immediately yield from the Schalkwijk-Bluestein formulae 
Dk = o~(1 -- p :y ,  
Qk = a~p(1 - p2)-k/~/a~, 
Bk = a~p( l  -- p2)k/ : /a . ,  
k = 1 ,2 , . . . ,N ;  
k = 1,2 . . . .  ,N;  
k = 1,2 . . . .  ,N. (ii) 
From (8) and the first equation of (11) evaluated at k = N the optimality of the recursive codes 
in (10b) is confirmed. 
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4. MARKET APPLICATIONS 
The work of Grossman and Stiglitz [2] assumes that market agents hold differing information 
sets about future prices. Informed agents pay a fee for "the latest forecast" of future prices 
while uninformed agents select to observe only market clearing prices to uncover the costly 
information. The authors argue: if the market conveys information perfectly, then there is no 
incentive to purchase information. Conversely, if all agents are uninformed it obviously pays 
some agents to become informed. Hence, perfect market information transfer through prices 
implies a competitive price equilibrium does not exist. The authors further argue that a price 
equilibrium has the property that prices reflect he costly information of informed traders but only 
partially so. 
We briefly develop the Grossman-Stiglitz model. Agents can choose a safe asset with a fixed 
return R and/or a risky asset with a future return u, and by paying a fee c they can observe a sample 
of 0 where 
u, = 0, + E, (12) 
with E ~ N(0, 02) indpendent of 0 ~ N(0, 02). Present price of the risky asset is P, and all agents 
maximize the expected value of an exponential utility function having a coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion a. Uninformed agents only observe P, and no agents observe the per capita supply of the 
risky asset x ~ N(0, 02x) independent of 0 and E. Maximizing expected utility results in the informed 
agent demand for risky assets 
di = (0 , -  Re,)/aa2, 
with a similar expression (with O, replaced by E [u,[P,] and 02 by var[u,[P,]) for uninformed emand. 
A parameter 2, 0 ~< 2 ~< 1, is defined as the ratio of informed to the total number of agents. The 
following economic description of the product ac suggests that it is the rate distortion function of 
the source 0. If c is high, and there are informed agents, then by their act of purchasing the 
information they are signaling that 0 is a reliable measure of future returns and conversely. If a 
is large then any agent akes a large market position thereby revealing this diminished risk aversion. 
Such positions ignal directly his regard for the reliability of 0 if he has purchased a sample thereof 
and indirectly (through P,) if not. The converse holds if a is small. 
A stationary, competitive equilibrium is said to exist if 0 < 2 < 1 and z, the ratio of the expected 
utility of informed agents to that of the uninformed, is unity or if z > 1 when 2 = 0 or if z < 1 
when 2 = 1. Grossman and Stiglitz show that 
z = e Qc [var (u lO) /var (u lP ) ]  I/2, 
with 
= eaC[(m + l)/(nm + m + I)] I/2 (13) 
and 
o; [o:1,o: 
Ot 0 2. 
Their main equilibrium result is: (a) if ¢ 2 = 0, an equilibrium never exists; (b) if 0 2 = 0, an 
equilibrium does not exist if and only if 
o2_1,,  e "c< l+~.~2j " (14) 
We observe that informed traders use the channel given by (12) while uninformed traders use 
the OLS  channel 
P, = atu, + n,. (I 5) 
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Note that the optimal OLS codes developed above apply to this channel. Let Ca be the capacity 
of(12) and Cup the capacity of (13). Taking logarithms of(13) under the condition z = I, 0 < 2 < I 
yields 
ac = Co, - Cup. (16) 
Equations (6) and (7) applied to the (0, u) channel allow a simple proof of the Grossman-Stiglitz 
equilibrium result. 
Proof. Part (a): if tr 2 = 0, D.an = tr2/1 + n = 0 so the (0, u) channel is perfectly revealing and 
therefore 2 = 0. But z(0)= 0 for n = oo so there never is an equilibrium. 
Part (b): if ac < ½ log(1 + n) the (0, u) channel is not perfectly revealing because D > D~. > 0. 
Thus, it pays to become informed so 2 > 0. But 2 > 0 and tr~ = 0 imply m = 0 and therefore 
C,p = Co,. Thus z(2) = 1 implies ac = 0. Hence there is no equilibrium if information is costly. The 
converse is readily proved with a contradiction argument. 
The next market application is the landmark model of Muth [3] with which he introduced the 
rational expectation hypothesis (REH). The REH is this: market agents are assumed to hold certain 
subjective probability distributions of price outcomes based upon the market price they expect o 
prevail in period t conditional on available information through period t - 1. The alignment of 
these subjective distributions with the realized istributions of the market place is called the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Included in the agent information set is the (t - 1)st market clearing price. 
This establishes a noiseless feedback path around the market channel. The Muth model has supply 
and demand sectors and an equilibrium condition, 
DEMAND 
SUPPLY 
EQUILIBRIUM 
9( t )  = - l ip( t )  + 9o + v(t) 
s( t )  = ~po(t) + So + w(t) 
D(t) = S(t) + r(t). (17) 
p( t )  is the market price in period t, pe(t) is the market price expected in period t conditional on 
available information through period t -  l, and v, w and r are zero mean, independent and 
individually identically distributed random error terms. The REH applied to (17) implies that 
agents act so as to achieve the equilibrium result 
E[p(t ) ]  = pc(t) =-/5, (18) 
where/5 is the static (v - w - r - 0) equilibrium price 
/5 = (Do - S0)/(~ + fl). (19) 
Equations (17) and (19) readily produce the reduced form model 
- ~ u ( t )  (20) 
p( t )  - ,5  = --if-- [p,(t) -/5] - --if-, 
where the density of u is the convolution of the density of w + r with that of v. The supply 
and demand sectors are subject to random disturbances in Do, So, ~, and fl so that/5 is a 
sample of a random variable with M possible values. This is the subjective distribution of the 
agents. Over a given trading epoch/5 is fixed. The agents' expectations are realized and an REH 
equilibrium exists if it is possible, using price measurements alone, to estimate/5 with arbitrarily 
small error probability. Specifically, if p is one of M possible price expectations and this /5 
elicits a vector p = [p(1), p(2) . . . . .  p(N)] of market clearing prices then a REH equilibrium exists 
if there exists a sequence of estimates Pc = [Pc (1), Pc (2) . . . . .  Pc (N)] depending only on p such that 
for any/5, 
lim Pr[pc(N) #/5] = 0. (21) 
N~oo 
We prove below that this defintion of an REI-I equilibrium includes (18) since we show that 
lim [p(N)] = plim Pe (N) =/5. (22) 
N--* oo N-~0o 
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Define x( t ) ,y ( t )  and n(t) as 
and (21) becomes the OLS model 
x(t)  = p~(t) --.6, 
y(t)  =# --p(t) ,  
1 
n(t) = - - z  u(t), (23) 
P 
? x(t)  + n(t). (24) y ( t )=~ 
The results of Schalkwijk and Kailath [7] are used to generate the optimal coding scheme for (24) 
that achieves an REH equilibrium. The stochastic approximation algorithm summarized below is 
due to Robbins and Monro [8] and is the basis of the asymptotic estimates derived by Schalkwijk 
and Kailath. 
If 
with z(t) zero mean and i.i.d., then 
x(t + l) : x( t ) - - l y ( t ) ,  
y(t)  = a[x(t) - O] + z(t), 
x(t  + l) ,-~ N[O, a~/a2t]. 
The definitions (23) and (24) give directly 
p~(t) ,,~ N[fi, a~/y2t] 
and the difference quation 
(25) 
(26) 
2_ay2[l p2], (29) O'u~ 
linear regression model with the well-known population constraints 
_ FP~ - P2P~2] tTy 
# _rp2-plp,2] y 
2 . . . .  ~ " - -~  L I-p,2 
B 
pe(t + 1) =pc(t) + ~ [p(t) - if]. (27) 
Equations (20) and (27) are, respectively, the instantaneous price clearing mechanism and price 
feedback rule by which agents adjust their price expectations to bring prices to equilibrium at ft. 
Observe that (21) is obviously true by (26). Solving (20) and (27) simultaneously, 
] p(t + 1) =/~ +~ u( i l - -u ( t+ l )  , 
[..6i=1 
so that (22) is proved. It is shown in O'Neill [9] that the feedback coding rule given in (27) achieves 
capacity for the Muth channel. 
The final economic model we present relates changes in the interest rate of long-term bonds to 
the difference between long- and short-term rates (the spread) and the premium paid (capital gain) 
for holding a long-term versus a short-term bond, Mankiw [10]. The REH theory states that the 
linear (approximate) relationship should be 
y(t)  = fllxl (t) + fl2x2(l) "~- u(t), (28) 
with y(t)  the long-term interest rate difference, xl (t) the premium, X2(/) the spread, and u(t) a zero 
mean, Gaussian, i.i.d, random disturbance t rm. This relationship is evidently a three variable, 
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where p~ = Pyx~, P2 = Pyx2, P12 = #xtx 2, 0"1 = 0-xt, 0"2 = 0"x2 and p is the correlation coefficient of the 
regression. The economic question asked of the model is: does the change in long-term rates 
simultaneously reflect information i  the capital markets (xl) and the bond markets (x2)? A nuance 
in this question arises because the interest rate of long-term bonds, though nominally fixed, changes 
with the price of bonds as determined in the capital markets. When u(t) is as specified then (29) 
is a white, Gaussian, mulitple access channel with noiseless feedback since all investors can observe 
published rates on long-term bonds. Sources x~ and x2 compete for information transfer through 
the market. Optimal codes operating in the achievable rate region of the channel should permit 
users to estimate xt and x2 reliably from measurements on y(t)  alone. Ozarow [11] has found the 
capacity region for the model fit = f12 = 1. The OLS constraints 
FPl  - -  P2Pl2q 2 2,&. var[/~'x']= l l---p~ J 0-,-pl, 
I-P2 -- P! Pl2q 2 2.~. 
var[fl2x2]= L ]-_--p~ j 0-,-p2, (30) 
give the capacity region for (28) as 
0 <~ Ri <~ ½ log[1 + p,(1 -- P~2).] 02 .j, i = 1,2; 
/ - - - - - - - -  
0 ~< RI + R2 ~< ~ log[1 -I" Pl + P2 + Pl2N/PtP2 / (31) 
/ 
The last equation of (29) indicates this region depends only on p~, P2, Pt2 and o.2,. Specific capacity 
producing codes are given by Ozarow for fl~ =/L = 1 and are shown to depend on a nonlinear, 
recursive, estimate of Pt2. 
5. SUMMARY 
We have shown that Shannon channels with feedback are significant models of economic 
markets. Known results for feedback channels, extended to include OLS constraints, provide 
reputable models of competitive markets. The rational expectations hypothesis is shown to be 
expressible by Shannon's coding theorem when competitive equilibrium is cast in terms of market 
agents being able to predict input information from market clearing prices. 
It is evident hat the theory of competitive markets can benefit from the results presently being 
produced by multiple access channel research. Particularly intriguing is the economic interpretation 
of multiple access codes. Is the n-user multiple access channel a useful model of the n-agent 
competitive market where every agent can be both a seller and a buyer of commodities depending 
on how he encodes his personal information or on how he decodes his competitor's information 
from market clearing prices? 
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